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ABSTRACT 
Techniques are described herein to allow each Domain Name System (DNS) packet 
to be identified by enterprise and device at the DNS server. The DNS server may apply 
security rules per device and generate reports and charts on a per device level of granularity 
for analytics about the traffic behavior/trend for each enterprise. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
All Domain Name System (DNS) resolution traffic, for all of a network’s devices, 
is received by a remote DNS server all on the same Internet Protocol (IP) address. The 
DNS server only knows what network, but not which enterprise customer or which device 
on that network, is making the request based on its network IP address. Therefore, it can 
only apply blanket policies to all of the network devices whose traffic is received from that 
network address.  
DNS filtering can be performed on all devices in a network and those rules are 
applied to all devices in that network. Internet of Things (IoT) and cellular networks are 
networks that are shared among multiple operators, and multiple enterprises. DNS filtering 
can be applied at an enterprise level but not on a device level for cellular devices or IoT 
devices within the operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) network. 
Accordingly, the techniques described herein enable an IoT network operator to 
apply policies and provide the capability for analytics and machine learning on a 
user/device level of granularity on a remote DNS server. A device level DNS filtering 
solution is provided with machine learning and device level analytics for IoT. An IoT 
network is comprised of shared nodes at the cellular operator or an operator partner’s 
network. When using these shared nodes, the devices are similarly viewed when going to 
the Internet as coming from a single IP address of the network on an external firewall. In 
some cases, a network operator may purchase multiple instances of the firewall, group 
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traffic on those separate IP addresses, and apply policies on the DNS server per network 
IP address (enterprise customer) but the policies are still applied as a whole to all devices 
received from that specific network IP address. Device identifiers are included to apply 
security policies on individual devices while providing a mechanism for machine learning 
and data analytics to generate insights into individual device behaviors. 
Existing next generation firewalls may be placed in the network. However, a 
separate firewall per IoT enterprise is required to apply the user defined policies and the 
dynamically updated policies defined on the remote DNS server. Yet this does not provide 
these enterprise customers the level of visibility at the device level provided by the solution. 
Additionally, in IoT enterprises that are relatively small or generate small revenue, a 
dedicated node in the network is not practical. The techniques described herein may be 
beneficial to the network operators by providing device level security policies, device 
behavior reporting, and allowing these IoT enterprises to scale without incurring costs by 
removing the requirement of having the cost prohibitive burden for upgrading to intelligent 
firewalls, and also operating and maintaining the additional network nodes. 
These techniques require little to no network infrastructure upgrades to apply 
policies and provide analytics on a device level granularity using a remote DNS server. 
Within the operator network, the user/device is identified, the DNS packet is broken down, 
and the DNS packet is reassembled with the user/device information to be filtered if 
necessary by the remote DNS server. This may also be logged for analytics and machine 
learning. 
Additional identifiers may be extracted from the Remote Authentication Dial-In 
User Service (RADIUS) call flow and included in the Extension mechanisms for DNS 
(EDNS) request. Those fields may be extended along with the original request to the DNS 
server to select the security policy on the individual device level. Analytical charts and logs 
may be generated for each device and enterprise. 
An example method for IoT device DNS policy and analytics is provided as follows. 
The first step is to collect the device network and authentication records from the 
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server and store that information in 
the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server. The second step is to capture 
the DNS packet in the load balancer. The third step is to initiate a lookup mechanism for 
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the device identifying information. The fourth step is to disassemble the DNS packet and 
reassemble the DNS packet with the device identifying information. The fifth step is to 
send the EDNS query sent to the DNS Server. The sixth step is to respond, at the DNS 
server, to the DNS request while applying the security policy based on the device 
identifying information and also store the records for that device for device level analytics. 
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An identifier is added in the EDNS0 request to identify a device among many 
different customers without changing the DNS name or the DNS query. Also, the ability 
to configure security policies is provided at the subscriber/device level, and all activities 
are logged for analytics purposes. Current techniques change or automate the DNS name 
which is the identifier of the device in order to be able to access each individual device. By 
contrast, the techniques described herein add the information in the packet to be interpreted 
by the remote DNS server for analytics and policy enforcement on the individual device 
level. 
The DNS standard (see Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for 
Comments (RFC) 2671) is used to attach a resource record to the DNS packet with the 
additional identifier without changing the DNS name or query name. This enables 
compatibility with any standard DNS server in the public cloud. Current techniques 
propose changing the DNS name within a private network to interpret different queries, 
whereas the techniques described herein append one or multiple identifiers to the additional 
section in the DNS query using the standard RFC 2671. If the query is received by a DNS 
server that does not comply with this standard, then it will not break the DNS flow but it 
may not be able to provide the additional layer of security and policy as needed. The 
aforementioned concept may be used along with device metadata from network nodes (e.g., 
AAA RADIUS servers) to extract dynamic parameters to couple them with different 
identifiers. 
 The techniques described herein are not vendor specific and may be used with any 
DNS service capable of supporting EDNS0. Moreover, the user is not required to use a 
specific firewall, and the existing network infrastructure may remain as-is with minimal 
network infrastructure upgrades required. Without these techniques, the user would have 
needed to deploy dedicated firewalls per IoT account to enable similar features. In addition, 
due to the amount of revenue that individual IoT accounts generate, these features cannot 
sustain positive revenue while having dedicated network nodes per account. 
In summary, techniques are described herein to allow each DNS packet to be 
identified by enterprise and device at the DNS server. The DNS server may apply security 
rules per device and generate reports and charts on a per device level of granularity for 
analytics about the traffic behavior/trend for each enterprise. 
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